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ABSTRACT
Managed care generally, and more specifically,
accountable care organizations (ACOs) have
attempted to provide coordination of patient care in
order to eliminate or reduce unnecessary procedures
and or test redundancy. The purpose of this research
was to study the effects of managed care in
accountable care organizations by decreasing health
care costs by increasing efficiency in health care.

Key Words
Accountable Care Organization, Managed Care,
primary care provider, cost, utilization review

1 INTRODUCTION
According to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
(CMS), in 2011 health care spending in the U.S. was
$2.7 trillion, or 17.9% of Gross Domestic Product,
and between 2009 and 2011 this spending increased
at 3.9% annually (CMS, 2012). One of the proposed
ideas to assist in resolving this problem has been
Managed Care (MC) via Accountable Care
Organizations (ACOs.

Managed care was the idea of creating coordination
of care in an attempt to control costs in health care
spending. The primary care physician in MC was
placed as the major point of control in terms of
monitoring utilization throughout the system; i.e., the
“gatekeeper” (Mains, Coustasse and Lykens, 2003).
The simple idea of an ACO was to formulate a unit
consisting of a local health care organization and/or a
related set of clinicians that take responsibility for
both the cost and quality of care rendered to a defined
population (Schoen et al., 2009).
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The use of ACOs has been attempted to provide the
coordination of patient care to eliminate or reduce
unnecessary procedures and/or test redundancy.
ACOs have aimed to distribute payment to providers
based on the quality of rendered care and not on the
incentive of Fee For Service (FFS), which has been
the model often used for payment (Correia, 2011).

Capitation is one of the methods in which ACOs have
been attempting to introduce cost containment
through the concept of a “per member per month”
(PMPM) being implemented as a set rate. In
allowing the reversal of the traditional financial
incentives for providers created by health insurance
companies, capitation has been an influential force
for cost containment (Hall, Ellman and Orentlicher,
2011).

2 METHODOLOGY

The primary hypothesis of this study was that
Primary Care Provider(s) (PCP) will decrease health
care expenditures through memberships in ACOs.
The secondary hypothesis was: MOCs will curb
overspending through utilization reviews and in
having a PCP as the gatekeeper.

This study consisted of a literature review of full text
articles cited on CINAHL, PubMed and EbscoHost.
Google was utilized when articles could not be
located through the previously noted databases. Key
words used in the search included ‘ACO’ AND
‘PCP’, OR ‘cost’, OR ‘MC’, OR ‘utilization review’.
The Kaiser Family Foundation and The New England
Journal of Medicine websites; recent textbooks were
also utilized. The search was limited to articles
published in English from 2000 to June 2013.
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Primary and secondary data were included from
articles, websites, and textbooks. Relevant articles
were selected after the review of abstracts was
performed. Following the literature search, all
references were independently screened by two
reviewers to identify all citations as meeting
inclusion criteria.

ACO-type organizations, that have assimilated
physicians and hospitals, have been passed along to
patients as decreased prices (Kocher and Sahni,
2011). Under volume-driven Fee For Service (FFS),
physician employment has been appealing to both
hospitals and physicians; although this trend has
grown it does not guarantee improved clinical
integration (O’Malley, Bond and Berenson, 2011).

3 RESULTS
Partnerships between Insurers and Providers
Hospitals Employment Strategy

In response to implementing health care reform, US
hospitals have been increasing the hiring of
physicians as a key to preparing expected Medicare
payment reforms which has included bundled
payments, ACOs, and penalties for preventable
hospital readmissions (Goldsmith, 2011). Initially
hospitals moved to employ physicians focusing on
specialists to form specific service lines, by doing so
increasing hiring of PCPs has lead to referrals for the
hospitals employed specialists (O’Malley, Bond and
Berenson, 2011).

Since new physicians today have been more inclined
to value better work-life equivalence, physicians have
been more willing to trade higher incomes for the
lifestyles that are provided by hospital employment
(Higgins et al., 2011). Kocher and Sahni (2011) note
a 75% increase in the number of active doctors
employed by hospitals since 2000; in turn,
percentages of US physician practices owned by
physicians have decreased from 70% in 2002 to 48%
in 2008, while the number of hospital-owned
practices have increased from 23% in 2002 to 53% in
2008. More physicians have become employed by
hospitals, and as this has been happening, hospitals
have been able to reduce excess costs associated with
inessential practice alteration and expensive supplies
selected by physicians that have not been essential
(Kocher and Sahni, 2011).

Hospital employment has been attractive to
beginning practice physicians because of the
perceived financial security and work-life balance;
hospitals have been achieving this by gaining higher
rates to offer better compensation than independent
physicians could get on their own (O’Malley, Bond
and Berenson, 2011). It has been uncertain whether
the benefits of improved care coordination, few
complications, and bottom dollar savings through

Various organizations have formed ACOs to serve
Medicare and commercial consumers with the
agreement of certain terms including of meeting
certain quality and outcome standards when
rendering care to a group of patients. If both partners
attain a savings greater than a certain percentage
compared with what would have been spent for the
same patients in a FFS model, the insurance company
rewards both partners with a share of the savings
(Beraducci, Langheim and Vars, 2012).

Several providers have teamed up with insurers to set
up commercial, non-Medicare ACOs. One such
ACO, AdvocateCare, was created in 2012 as an
association between Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Illinois and Advocate Health Care of Chicago. After
six months of providing care to 750,000 members,
some successful utilization results were obtained.
During the first six months of 2011, hospital
admissions decreased 10.6% and emergency
department visits by 5.4% in comparison to the same
time frame of the previous year (Berarducci,
Langheim and Vars, 2012).
Payment Methods and Financial Incentives

Two very different payment methods to support
ACOs, a Shared Savings Program (SSP) and partial
capitation referred to as Population-Based Payment
(PBP), have been implemented (Lieberman and
Bertko, 2001).

Under the basic SSP concept, providers are paid on a
FFS basis. Yet, Medicare has been responsible for
determining the expected total expenditures for
patients cared for by the ACO as well as measuring
and assessing the quality of care (Berwick, 2011).
The ACO awards a bonus if quality care was
provided for less than predicted by Medicare. The
possibility of an ACO achieving a bonus was
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determined by spending targets; a critical issue
achieved through various configurations. Many
ACOs have found the SSP payment attractive since
bonuses have been implemented on a shared savings
approach, which did not involve any financial risk
taking activity (Berwick, 2011). A disadvantage of
the SSP payment method for ACOs has been the FFS
incentive of “do more, get paid more” (Lieberman
and Bertko, 2011). ACOs have been more likely to
not participate in advanced treatment and care
services that were not funded by the FFS system
since the ACO would have to directly fund these
services without the guarantee of being financially
rewarded (Rosenthal, Cutler and Feder, 2011).
Although the FFS system is not perfect, many have
thought the likelihood of a generous bonus to the
ACO for achieving overall savings could achieve
different referral patterns so that care is conveyed to
the clinicians who make valuable use of resources
(Rosenthal, Cutler and Feder, 2011).

Alternatively, the partial capitation or PBP system
prepays a provider a predetermined amount for
services to a specific group of people for a fixed
period. With the PBP payment method, providers
have to consider all resources needed to care for the
patients for whom they are responsible, which
involves a greater financial risk (Rosenthal, Cutler
and Feder, 2011). The partial capitation has had
many advantages over the SSP payment method
making it more attractive to this organization. ACOs
and affiliated providers have had more incentive and
flexibility to implement advanced treatment and care
services not funded in the FFS system (Lieberman
and Bertko, 2011). ACOs also receive payment
upfront, which better allows for capital and other
investments. The payment incentives have differed
with partial capitation with the hospital being a “cost
center”; conversely, with a SSP, the hospitals have
been an accounting “profit center” for an ACO
(DeVore and Champion, 2011). There has not just
been incentive for the ACOs to cut total costs, but
continuously maintain the improvements. Overall,
the SSP has not limited patient choice in providers or
required financial risks for providers (Lieberman and
Bertko, 2011).

4 CONCLUSIONS

MC evolved and shows some promising results
through the introduction of ACOs. The Affordable
Care Act (ACA) has encouraged the use of MC
through ACOs to help reduce health care spending in

the US. If an ACO achieved improved care while the
cost of providing that decreased, it shared in the
savings it achieved for Medicare (Berwick, 2011).
The majority of the information that was once
theoretical in nature has been producing long-term
outcomes in reducing health care spending.
Berarducci, Langheim and Vars (2012) found success
with partnerships between insurers and providers
after setting up AdvocateCare, which provided care
to 750,000 members. During the first six months of
2011, hospital admissions were decreased to 10.6%
and emergency department visits were down 5.4% in
comparison to the same timeframe of the year 2010.

However, one has seen the projected effects of future
outcomes with MC having been around for a few
decades. Concepts such as capitation to replace FFS
have never been fully recognized because of the
reduced monetary income this had caused with PCPs
in the past. Capitation alone has been used by MC
organizations to regulate increased spending in health
care since the 1990’s (Frakt and Mayes, 2012). The
thought has been to try a hybrid of capitation and
FFS, along with UR to lower health care costs while
increasing quality.

PCPs have had the ability to help lower health care
spending with more thorough preventative care
measures that have been implemented under the
ACA, which provides 100% coverage for all
preventative services. Since the focus of health care
has been geared toward preventative care versus
disease treatment, the effect has lowered costs in
health care spending. Education has been indicated
to assist in decreased spending and assisted in
lowered costs. Patients who have an understanding of
the system have utilized their PCP to help them make
informed decisions.
However, ultimately the
responsibility lies with the PCP to assist consumers
to make informed decisions that may help curb overspending (O’Malley, Bond and Berenson, 2011)
concluded that by US hospitals increasing the hiring
of physicians is a key to expected Medicare payment
reforms. Subsequently there has been an increase in
the number of physicians employed by hospitals,
although it is unclear whether ACO-type
organizations that have incorporated physicians and
hospitals have actually decreased prices on a patient
level (Kocher and Sahni, 2011).

Two payment methods that support ACOs included
SSP and PBP. Under the SSP concept, incentives
were used in that if the ACO provided quality care
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for less than predicted, a bonus was awarded. A
disadvantage of the SSP payment method for ACOs
has been the FFS incentive of “do more, get paid
more” (Lieberman and Bertko, 2011). Alternatively,
the PBP system has prepaid the provider a
predetermined amount for a fixed amount of time to a
specific group. This payment method has shown to
be a greater financial risk than the SSP concept.
Consequently, ACOs have not been a huge game
changer in the short run of bending the cost curve and
improving quality of care, but have been definitely
worth a shot given the history of problems with the
FFS (Devers and Berenson, 2011).
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